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DDAS Accident Report 
 
Accident details 
Report date: 18/05/2006 Accident number: 238 
Accident time: 08:45 Accident Date: 03/06/1998 
Where it occurred: Butkhak village, 
Bagrami district, Kabul 
Province 
Country: Afghanistan 
Primary cause: Field control 
inadequacy (?) 
Secondary cause: Inadequate equipment 
(?) 
Class: Excavation accident Date of main report: [No date recorded] 
ID original source: none Name of source: MAPA/UNOCHA 
Organisation: Name removed  
Mine/device: PMN-2 AP blast Ground condition: bushes/scrub 
electromagnetic 
hard 
pylons and surrounds 
Date record created: 17/02/2004 Date  last modified: 17/02/2004 
No of victims: 2 No of documents: 2 
 
Map details 
Longitude:  Latitude:  
Alt. coord. system:  Coordinates fixed by:  
Map east:  Map north:  
Map scale: not recorded Map series:  
Map edition:  Map sheet:  
Map name:   
 
Accident Notes 
inadequate metal-detector (?) 
protective equipment not worn (?) 
request for machine to assist (?) 
disciplinary action against victim (?) 
safety distances ignored (?) 
pressure to work quickly (?) 
1 
use of shovel (?) 
 
Accident report 
At the time of the accident the demining group were working with a "new" one-man drill in 
two man teams (changing about every 15 minutes). 
An accident report was made on behalf of the UN MAC and made available in September 
1999. The following summarises its content. 
The accident occurred on land around power pylons that was described as "medium" hard. 
Victim No.1 had been a deminer for 11 months and had last attended a revision course four 
months before. Victim No.2 had been a Section Leader for the demining group for ten 
months. The mine was identified as a PMN-2 from fragments found at the site. 
The room around the pylons was limited, so deployment was in sections using a one-man 
breaching drill. The pylons were protected with barbed wire and there were bushes present. 
Photographs of the site showed no bushes or barbed wire. Because the detectors signalled 
continuously the deminers were having to prod/excavate with a bayonet. The accident 
investigators believed that the detector signalled continuously because of the power-line and 
an "underground earth line".  
Victim No.1 found two PMN-2 mines while excavating and they were destroyed. At about 
08:45 he paused to remove loose soil and removed his helmet and visor. He used a shovel 
to remove the loose soil and detonated a mine. As a "result he got serious injuries on his 
both eyes, face". His Section Leader was not maintaining the correct safety distance (4m 
away) and was also injured.  
The victims were treated on site, then removed to a local hospital, then Kabul and then 
Victim No.1 was evacuated by air to hospital in Peshawar, Pakistan. 
The Team Leader stated that Victim No.1 was working properly removing "dead soil" after 
prodding. He thought that something may have dropped from the power-line to cause the 
accident or that the removal of the soil might have pulled some of the barbed wire and 
bushes around the pylon and caused the accident. He said that Victim No.1 suffered injuries 
to his eyes, face and his right leg below the knee. Victim No.2 "got a fragment on his face" 
and "smoke" in his eyes. He thought that the use of a back-hoe would prevent such incidents 
in future. 
The Victim stated that he was "prodding" but that the mine in the accident was deeper than 
the others so he did not prod deeply enough.  
 
Conclusion 
The investigators concluded that the victim failed to "keep enough distance between cleared 
and uncleared area" [dug with the shovel beyond the area he had checked]. They also 
identified pressure from the local authorities to clear the area quickly, which had prevented 
the deminers from attending a refresher course, as a contributory factor. 
 
Recommendations 
The investigators recommended that dogs be used in areas with continuous readings 
whenever possible and that machines be used when dogs cannot. They further 
recommended that the use of a shovel in AP mined areas be stopped, that the Section 
Leader be disciplined and that the regional office liaise with the local authorities to try to stop 
them applying pressure "during operations".  
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Victim Report 
Victim number: 310 Name: Name removed 
Age:  Gender: Male 
Status: deminer  Fit for work: not known 
Compensation: not made available Time to hospital: not recorded 
Protection issued: Helmet 
Thin, short visor 
Protection used: none 
 
Summary of injuries: 
INJURIES 
minor Face 
minor Hand 
minor Head 
minor Legs 
severe Eyes 
COMMENT 
See medical report. 
 
Medical report 
A mine casualty report listed Victim No.1's injuries as: 
injuries to both eyes and temporal area; 
head at frontal area; 
left hand between thumb and fourth finger; 
small injuries on left leg; 
perforation on left ear; 
corneal abrasion both eyes; 
superficial face. 
The demining group reported victim No.1's injuries as: 
foreign bodies both eyes; 
foreign body intercranial at Rt temporal region; 
lacerated wounds forehead, left hand, right leg. 
A medic's sketch (reproduced below) showed a below knee, right leg abrasion/laceration and 
an above knee, left leg abrasion/laceration, a left hand laceration along with forehead and 
facial burns, abrasions and lacerations. 
3 
 
The treatments given were illegible - but may have been: "Hemaccil 500cc, Dipyron, Apiclox 
1000mg" 
Photographs of Victim No.1 showed his legs bandaged above and below the knee, his right 
hand bandaged and his face being cleaned. His eyes were swollen and there were multiple 
light fragment injuries on his forehead, nose and cheeks.  
 
Victim Report 
Victim number: 311 Name: Name removed 
Age:  Gender: Male 
Status: supervisory  Fit for work: presumed 
Compensation: not made available Time to hospital: not recorded 
Protection issued: Helmet 
Thin, short visor 
Protection used: none 
 
Summary of injuries: 
INJURIES 
minor Eyes 
minor Face 
COMMENT 
See medical report. 
 
Medical report 
A mine casualty report listed Victim No.2's injuries as: 
foreign bodies both eyes; 
multiple bruises on face. 
A sketch showed fragments and lacerations to both eyes of Victim No.2. 
At 08:49 the field medic gave inj-pipyron 2cc and Ampiclox 500g 
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Photographs of Victim No.2 showed light cheek lacerations and dressed eyes.  
 
Analysis 
The primary cause of this accident is listed as a "Field control inadequacy" for two reasons. 
1.  Victim No.1 should not have continued to remove soil when the supervisor approached 
him. Victim No.2, the supervisor, should have stopped him.  
2. Victim No.1 was wrong to assume that the mine would not be any deeper than those he 
had previously located at a shallow depth. The supervisor should have recognised what he 
was doing and stopped him. 
It is questionable whether a shovel was the right tool to use for the removal of loose earth 
before checking again with a detector. A smaller, more controllable tool is usually preferred. 
The secondary cause is listed as “Inadequate equipment”. 
However, it is interesting to note that in this case the UN MAC put pressure on the demining 
group and the supervisor was dismissed. In other cases where the failure of supervision was 
more extreme, the same pressure seems not to have been applied and all blame has fallen 
on the deminer. 
 
2000 MAC manager comment  
In nearly all cases, the MAC recommends or requests that appropriate disciplinary action be 
taken by the NGO HQ against the concerned individuals. It is then up to the NGO to decide 
the actual disciplinary action to be taken. In rare cases of blatant, incontestable and gross 
negligence, the MAC will insist that concerned individuals be dismissed. 
 
Related papers 
A sketch map showed that the accident occurred close to the "leg" of a pylon. 
A letter from the UN MAC to the demining group demanding corrective action was on file. 
A letter to the UN MAC from the demining group recorded that the Section Leader (Victim 
No.2) was dismissed "due to poor supervision and control over his section". 
A letter from the regional MAC to the UN MAC explained that the density of mines around 
each pylon (20-40) was the reason for not deploying dogs. It also reported ongoing success 
in discussions with the local authorities in the attempt to make them understand the 
demining programme.  
Documents were not made available for copying. 
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